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Changed from talked to mature to respond to the domestic car recall changed taste (Figure)
On November 20, Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. submitted a recall report to the AQSIQ (General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine). Starting from November 26, the company initiated a recall of its Oriental Sons series models produced between July 14, 2003, and May 6, 2005—totaling 18,673 units. This marked the first time an independent Chinese automaker had implemented a voluntary product recall, signaling a shift in the industry's approach to quality assurance.
The move came one year after the AQSIQ released its "Annual Report on the Implementation of Defective Automobile Products Recall Management Regulations." Since then, the automotive sector has evolved from initial hesitation to a more mature and cooperative response. Recalls, once seen as a negative, are now becoming a standard practice across both domestic and international manufacturers.
According to data from the China Automotive Recall Network, from June 18, 2004, to October 28, 2005, a total of 38 recalls were carried out. These included 11 engine-related issues, 9 brake and wheel defects, 9 body part problems, and 3 each for steering/suspension, power transmission, air conditioning, and electronic systems. Among joint-venture brands, Changan Suzuki’s Alto sedans were the most recalled, with 157,450 units affected. FAW Toyota Vios followed with at least 9 vehicles recalled. For imported cars, Mercedes-Benz E-class models topped the list with 5,345 units, while the A-Class and VIANO saw only one unit each recalled.
In terms of regional origin, Japanese brands accounted for 20 recalls, European brands 10, Korean brands 4, and American brands 3. Internationally, major recalls were also common. In April 2005, Mercedes-Benz recalled over 1.3 million vehicles, and in October and November, Toyota conducted multiple recalls, including 1.27 million Corolla and Vios models, 160,000 Prius, and 246,000 Crown and Sienna models.
Domestically, Mercedes-Benz’s recall efforts aligned with global trends. Notably, both Mercedes-Benz and Mitsubishi had already begun recalling vehicles before October 1, 2004, under pressure from local authorities. However, not all companies approached recalls uniformly. Toyota, for instance, adopted a selective strategy. While it recalled three Lexus models in China without delay, it refused to recall 1,163 defective Land Cruisers in September 2005, claiming no safety risks under Chinese law. Instead, it offered free repairs through dealers. Yet, just months earlier, it had recalled 1,163 Land Cruisers due to non-safety-related air conditioning issues, raising questions about its recall policy.
Domestic manufacturers faced similar scrutiny. FAW Car and Changan Suzuki led in recall scale, but many questioned whether these actions were genuine or merely for public relations. In contrast to foreign recalls that often highlighted serious safety concerns—such as engine failure, fire hazards, increased collision risk, and passenger injury—the domestic announcements rarely mentioned such critical issues. An anonymous dealer suggested that many recalls involved minor, easily fixable problems, with few manufacturers willing to admit significant flaws.
During the recall process, some companies even assembled competing vehicles for testing, while others took high-profile approaches despite previously maintaining a low profile. Many believed that the term “recall†was being used more as a marketing tool than a genuine consumer protection measure.
Why do recalls happen so frequently? While public perception has matured, and people no longer automatically associate recalls with poor quality, frequent recalls still raise concerns. Consumers began questioning whether self-reliant brands could maintain reliable quality. The case of FAW Toyota’s Vios recall sparked controversy, with the company claiming only nine vehicles were affected. Their explanation—that the internal quality team discovered the issue and only those nine were sold—was met with skepticism. At the same time, they used the opportunity to promote their rapid response and lean production model.
However, critics argue that Toyota’s global recall of 1.27 million vehicles—produced between 2000 and 2002—suggests a lack of investment in quality control. If lean production failed to detect defects for such a long period, where was the precision? Where were the benefits? If a manufacturer cannot accept responsibility for its products, excessive recalls may damage its reputation rather than build trust. (Text by Zheng Haiyang)